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Implementation of Basel Rules in Brazil: What are the
Implications for Development Finance?
Ricardo Gottschalk and Cecilia Azevedo Sodré
Abstract
This paper is set to examine the developmental impact of international Codes
and Standards (C&S) as they are applied to the banking system in Brazil. It is
driven by the questions: to what extent has compliance with international C&S
affected, or may affect in the future, credit to the SMEs and the poor? Through
what mechanisms? What changes (institutional, other) have occurred as a
result? The paper focuses on the implementation of the Basel rules – Basel I
and II. It finds strong indications that, as a result of implementation of Basel I in
Brazil, credit as a proportion of the country’s GDP declined gradually between
1994 (when Basel I was adopted) and early this century. The paper also argues
that Basel I probably contributed to the decline in the number of banks in Brazil
since 1994, and to banking concentration as well. Furthermore, the paper shows
that although Basel I has affected credit in Brazil, there is no clear evidence that
credit to the SMEs, to rural producers or to the urban poor was negatively
affected, at least not in a major way. The paper suggests that a main reason for
this outcome is that credit patterns during the period under Basel I have been
influenced by directed credit policy, which in a number of cases were intended
to protect the less favoured segments. In relation to Basel II, the paper shows
that Brazil’s regulators are proposing a gradual approach for the full imple-
mentation of these new banking rules. The paper sees this approach as 
appropriate for a developing country like Brazil where banks need time,
resources and capacity building to be able to adopt Basel II in its entirety. But it
also argues that the proposed framework lacks any countervailing mechanisms
or instruments to address three key potentially negative implications concerning
the new Basel rules: possible further banking concentration, concentration of
banks’ portfolios away from SMEs and towards big corporations, and 
accentuated bank credit pro-cyclicality.
Keywords: Basel Rule, development finance, SMES, the poor
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1 Introduction
Since the East Asian crisis, developing countries have been encouraged to
implement codes and standards (C&S) of international best practice in the 
financial sector.1 The main objective of this initiative has been to strengthen
these countries’ financial systems, thereby reducing their vulnerability to shocks
and changing circumstances in the global environment. Many developing 
countries have made strides in enhancing their financial systems through the
adoption of international C&S. Of course, initial efforts to improve banking
supervision and regulation, which are part of these standards, can be detected
since the late 1980s and early 1990s, when developing countries started to
undertake financial liberalisation reforms. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the developmental impact of
international C&S, as they are applied to the banking system in Brazil. A parallel
study has been undertaken for India, whose findings are also reported in an IDS
Working Paper. The study was driven by the question: to what extent has
compliance with international C&S affected, or may affect in the future, credit to
SMEs and the poor? This question is important because efforts have been made
to assess the degree of implementation of standards in Brazil, but little has been
done to see if and how implementation of standards has affected the country’s
development finance. In addressing this question, the study focuses on the
implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
and the Basel Capital Accords (Basel I and II). 
The paper addresses in particular the following questions:
1 Through what mechanisms may the adoption of C&S affect development 
finance, and what institutional changes may occur as a result?
2 What is the impact of these changes on the provision of finance to SMEs 
and the poor?
3 If the impacts of adoption of C&S on development finance are negative, 
what new modalities of development finance, if any, are emerging in Brazil 
to overcome such shortcomings?
To address and find answers to these questions, extensive interviews were 
conducted in Brazil,2 on which this paper draws. In addition, it draws on 
literature review, and data collection and analysis of key national financial 
indicators. 
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1 Of importance here are those 12 C&S the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) considers as 
key for sound financial systems. These are standards in monetary and financial policy 
transparency, fiscal policy transparency, data dissemination, insolvency, corporate 
governance, accounting, auditing, payment and settlement, market integrity, banking 
supervision, securities regulation and insurance supervision – see FSF website
www.fsforum.org/Standards/KeySTds.html
The main findings are that Basel I has contributed to a sharp fall in the share of
banks’ credit assets in their total assets, and to a declining trend in total credit
as a proportion of the country’s GDP. This is in itself a worrying trend, given
that in Brazil total credit as a proportion of GDP was already very low. The
adoption of Basel I in Brazil probably has also contributed to a higher degree of
banking concentration. This fact can have negative implications for the provision
of credit to the SMEs, as the large banks in Brazil have little incentive to cater
for this segment of the market. 
But most worrying among the findings was that, despite international consen-
sus that the New Basel rules (known as Basel II) may restrict credit to the SMEs,
scant thought is being given in Brazil on what could be done to mitigate this
effect taking place, when the new rules come into effect in early 2007. A 
negative impact on development finance could happen mainly through further
banking concentration and the concentration of banks’ credit portfolio away
from SMEs and towards big companies. Moreover, little is being done to
address a further likely implication, which is the increase in the pro-cyclicality of
bank credit. 
On the positive side, the study has found that the maintenance of a few 
development banks despite ample banking restructuring towards reducing the
number of public banks, and of a long-standing system of directed credit, has
helped protect credit levels to productive urban sectors and rural activities. Thus,
both development banks and directed credit, which are key parts of the 
country’s development finance architecture, acted as countervailing forces
against the negative effects of the Basel rules on credit to the less favoured.
The paper is organised in four sections. The second section starts with a 
discussion on why to explore the link between C&S and development finance,
and why institutions for development finance are still important. The third 
section looks at what steps Brazil has undertaken towards adoption of Basel I
and II, and how banks have responded to that. As regards Basel I, it explains
how the Brazilian government applied it to the country’s banking system, how
banks adjusted to it, and what the government did to help them overcome the
difficulties they faced in the adjustment process. Concerning Basel II, the paper
reports how the Brazilian banking authorities intend to apply it to Brazil, and
how Brazilian banks are preparing themselves for the New Capital Accord. It
discusses possible implications of Basel II for development finance, as well as the
views and concerns of both the public and private banking sectors on the 
matter.
The fourth section describes the structure of Brazil’s financial system, and how it
together with credit has evolved in the country since 1994, when Basel I was
adopted. These trends are analysed with the intent of answering some of the
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2 The interviews were conducted with central bank officials, including top financial 
regulators based in these institutions; representatives of national associations of banks, 
bankers from both public and private banks, and senior financial market consultants.
questions raised in the second section, such as whether credit declined and if so
to whom, and what role Basel I may have had in the process. Finally, the paper
offers suggestions on ways to reduce the possible negative effects of Basel II on
development finance in Brazil, as well as lessons for other developing countries. 
2 Codes and standards and 
development finance
2.1 Why linking C&S to development finance?
C&S have the clear purpose of helping to strengthen domestic financial systems
in developing countries. They are not intended to address their development
financing needs. The latter should be addressed through institutional action. But
C&S are not a fixed set of rules countries should adopt unquestionably. They are
a package involving a number of general and specific rules for adoption, and
developing country regulators have the discretion to choose those rules – and if
necessary adapt them – that are most suited to their countries’ needs and 
circumstances. 
This study takes the view that within the C&S package certain rules can be
inimical to growth and poverty reduction. They may contribute to the reshaping
of a developing country financial system in a way that undermines the ability of
the system to provide development finance. Moreover, rules change over time
and new rules can sometimes be complex, making it difficult to figure out their
possible implications for stability, growth or poverty reduction. 
Today, developing countries are being encouraged to strengthen their financial
systems through compliance with international C&S. In this context, developing
country regulators are facing a key challenge: how to adopt these C&S at the
national level. Concerning C&S in the banking system, the challenge has
become even more difficult, as a new package of international standards – the
New Basel Capital Accord (or Basel II), has been recently approved. Although
there is an ongoing debate about a number of technical issues involving the
adoption of these new standards, little has been discussed about their possible
implications for credit provision to development-related projects. 
This is worrying, because these standards are being implemented at a time
when there has been scant support for developing countries to build institutions
to support development finance. Where such institutions exist, in most cases
efforts have been not to strengthen but to dismantle them. So, lack of
attention to regulatory implications for development finance is bound to 
compound the problem. 
2.2 Why are institutions for development finance still important? 
Financial markets are characterised by market failures and missing markets. In
developing countries in particular there is a lack of certain markets – for
11 
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example markets for long-term credits. This is partly due to lack of sophisticated
instruments, which make it extremely hard for intermediaries to transform
short-term liabilities into long-term finance, a crucial ingredient for large 
development projects. Moreover, in a number of cases private returns differ
from social returns. Banks therefore may choose not the project that offers the
highest total returns, but the one that the bank itself has the highest return
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Missing markets and externalities thus justify 
institutional action, to ensure that socially efficient projects are financed. 
Financial markets suffer in particular from information asymmetry, which
impairs the ability of the banking system to assess risk. The result is that credit is
rationed (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Because markets are not cleared, the banking
system ends up operating in an inefficient way. The system is moreover
inefficient in how it allocates resources. Due to information asymmetry, the 
system becomes biased towards lending to big companies and against small
borrowers. 
2.3 Can C&S address the informational problems, thereby helping
the banking systems overcome their lending limitations?
Financial policy transparency and data dissemination are two among the main
standards in the financial sector. These are expected to improve financial stability
and efficiency. Data dissemination (and therefore information availability) is a key
standard in support of financial efficiency. The rationale is that lenders and
investors will be able to make better informed allocation decisions. This is a key
hypothesis that, if true, would in good measure help tackle the information
asymmetry problems raised by Stiglitz and his followers. 
However, we believe that the information asymmetry problem cannot be
entirely overcome. The first reason is that information is costly, especially for
banks in developing countries. Second, even if information is made available, still
it is not totally exogenous. Borrowers’ behaviour can be affected by the lenders’
actions, for example by the level of interest rates they charge (Stiglitz and Weiss
1981; Stiglitz 1993). Given that inefficiencies arise from imperfect information, a
case exists for government intervention to improve efficiency in the financial
system. 
Thus, greater transparency and availability of information may improve the 
stability and efficiency of the financial system, but not entirely. In addition, we
ask the question: can certain C&S be inimical to specific development objectives,
such as the levels of credit provision, and credit provision to the SMEs and the
poor? Going a step further, can they even undermine stability, if not properly
implemented?
The recently approved New Basel Capital Accord or Basel II has as one of its
main objectives to encourage internationally active banks to adopt risk sensitive
models so that credit and other risks can be more accurately measured. These
risk sensitive models to work properly require the use by banks of a large set of
data information on their current and prospective clients. Efforts to obtain
IDS WORKING PAPER 273
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information about potential borrowers are seen as a positive aspect. It can
reduce lenders’ uncertainty about borrowers’ ability to honour loan contracts,
with a consequent positive impact on the cost and possibly availability of funds
to projects that are economically sound. 
We nonetheless believe that there is a limit to the extent to which one can
obtain information about borrowers. This is especially true for small borrowers,
who in developing countries are in their large majority in the informal sector,
which makes it extremely difficult for banks to obtain the sort of information
they need for risk assessment. 
More broadly, we raise three objections in relation to Basel II and the models it
proposes for adoption:
1 To the extent that risk-sensitive models are not universally adopted, but 
only by the larger banks, it can lead to banking concentration.
2 The use of these models can lead to concentration of a banks’ portfolio 
away from SMEs and towards big corporations.
3 Being risk sensitive, these models can moreover increase the pro-cyclicality 
of bank lending.
These possible negative implications, which will serve as a guide in our study,
have been pointed out by a number of international policymakers and 
academics, including Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2003) and Griffith-Jones (2003),
and in the specific case of bank portfolio concentration away from the SMEs,
acknowledged and to some extent addressed by the Basel Committee, in
response to pressures from the German government.
To summarise the main points made so far, this study takes the view that 
(1) financial systems do not provide credit to different segments in an efficient
way, due to market failures and information deficiencies. As a result, credit to
the poor in particular is affected. An increase in information will not solve the
problem. There is a need for institutional action. (2) C&S in the financial sector
may help ensure stability of the system. But it does not contribute to an
increase in credit provision to the poor. That is our main concern. In the specific
case of Basel II, which is the focus of our study, the new rules may potentially
have a negative effect on development finance, and even on stability.
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3 Implementation of C&S, and 
Basel I and II
3.1 What steps has Brazil undertaken towards compliance with
C&S?
The 12 standards that the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)3 considers as key for a
sound financial system can be grouped in three main areas: (1) macroeconomic
policy and data transparency; (2) institutional and market infrastructure and 
(3) financial regulation and supervision. As said earlier, the focus of this study is
on the Basel Capital Accords, or Basel I and II, which are standards under the
area of financial regulation and supervision. We thus discuss Basel I and II in
what follows. Information on implementation of the 12 standards more broadly
can be found in Gottschalk and Sodré (2005).
3.2 The Basel Capital Accord – Basel I
The Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) is an agreed regulatory framework for capital
adequacy that the Basel Committee for Banking Regulation and Supervision
recommended for implementation in 1988. Its ultimate aim was to improve the
soundness and stability of national banking systems and of the international
financial system. This was to be achieved through the promotion of inter-
national convergence in the rules for setting minimum capital requirements for
internationally active banks (Basel 1998). Of course, it was expected that 
national regulators would also consider such rules for other banks under their
jurisdictions as well. 
According to this framework, internationally active banks are expected to meet
a total capital requirement of at least 8 per cent in relation to their risk-
weighted assets. The required capital should have two tiers: core capital and
supplementary capital. Assets (and off-balance sheet exposures) are assigned
weights according to their relative riskiness, ranging from 0 per cent to 100 per
cent (applied over the 8 per cent of capital). The framework was initially
designed to address credit risk. In the subsequent 10 years, it was amended to
include other types of risk, including market risk and concentration risk. The risk
weights for different categories of assets are displayed in Table 3.1.
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3 The FSF was created soon after the East Asian crisis to identify systemic risk situations 
and regulatory gaps in the international financial system.
Table 3.1 Risk weights for different types of assets as defined by
Basel I
Source: Basel (1998).
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Weight Loans to/Investment in:
0% l OECD central governments 
l Central governments that borrow in the national 
currency
l Borrowers with OECD central governments’ 
collaterals or guarantees
From 0% to 50% (at
the discretion of
national regulators)
l Domestic public sector entities outside the 
central government; borrowers with such 
entities’ collaterals or guarantees
20% l Multilateral development banks (MDBs); borrow
ers with MDBs collaterals or guarantees
l OECD banks and securities firms; borrowers with
OECD banks and securities firms’ collaterals or
guarantees 
l Non-OECD banks with maturity of up to one 
year; borrowers with non-OECD banks’ 
collaterals or guarantees, with maturity up to one
year
l Non-domestic OECD public sector entities out
side the central government; borrowers with 
such entities’ collaterals or guaranteesMultilateral 
development banks (MDBs); borrowers with 
MDBs collaterals or guarantees
50% l Mortgage borrowers who inhabit the residential 
property or rent it.
100% l Private sector
l Non-OECD Banks with maturity of over one 
year
l Non-OECD central governments (unless they 
borrow in the national currency)
l Real estate
l Capital instruments issued by other banks.
3.2.1 The Adoption of Basel I in Brazil
Brazil adhered to Basel I in September 1994 through the Resolution 2099 of
Brazil’s Central Bank.4 The resolution established that to appropriately address
credit risk, Brazil’s financial institutions had to meet a minimum level of capital
of 8 per cent in relation to risk-weighted assets. Later in 1997 the 8 per cent
limit was raised to 11 per cent,5 thus higher than the 8 per cent recommended
by the Basel Committee, a decision justified on the grounds that Brazil’s 
financial institutions were subject to higher macroeconomic volatility and shocks
than financial institutions based in the rich countries. In addition, the risk
weights assigned to different categories of assets were slightly adapted – see
Table A1, annex 1. The Central Bank established in addition capital requirements
for market and other types of risks, following advice from the original Basel
Capital Accord document and subsequent ones that addressed these other
types of risks in greater detail.
The reason given for the adoption of Basel I in 1994 was that Brazil’s domestic
banks were becoming increasingly exposed to the international financial 
markets, and therefore there was a need to adjust regulation to this new 
reality. But, in retrospect, it can be said that Basel I in Brazil was part of a big-
ger package of banking reforms undertaken in the second half of the 1990s and
early this century. We thus next examine the impact of Basel I in Brazil taking a
broader picture, to include analysis of the banking reform package, which 
interacted with the changes in the regulatory framework for the banking 
system. 
Two major instruments were set up to undertake a major cleaning and restruc-
turing of the banking system: the Programme for the Restructuring and
Strengthening of the Financial System (PROER), and the Programme of
Incentives for the Reduction of State Level Public Sector in the Banking
Activities (PROES).6 The PROER provided credit lines and fiscal incentives to
support organisational restructuring that resulted in mergers and acquisitions
among private banks. The PROES provided credit lines so that public banks at
the State Levels could be closed, privatised or transformed into public
development agencies.7, 8
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4 Resolution 2099, of 17 September 1994.
5 Specifically, in June 1997 the minimum capital level was raised to 10 per cent 
(Resolution 2399/1997) and later in November of the same year, to 11 per cent (Circular
no. 2784/1997).
6 The PROER or Programa de Estimulo a Reestruracao e ao Fortalecimento do Sistema 
Financeiro, was set up in November 1995; and the PROES or Programa de Incentivo a 
Reducao do Setor Publico Estadual na Atividade Bancaria, in September 1996. Both 
PROER and PROES were modified on a number of occasions thereafter. 
7 Andrezo and Lima (2002) provide a descriptive summary of these programmes, and 
how they evolved over time.
By the end of 1997, 48 banks of a total of 270 private banks (retail, investment)
were restructured and ended up being incorporated by other financial 
institutions, or transferred to the Federal Government under the PROER
(Andrezo and Lima 2002). The restructuring process continued until into this
century, with new rounds of mergers and acquisitions. During the period, large
retail banks with national coverage, such as Nacional, Bamerindus, 
Excel-Economico and Real were acquired by Unibanco, HSBC, Bilbao Vizcaya
and ABN Amro Bank, respectively.
Under the PROES, nearly all banks at the State level were either closed, 
privatised, had their control transferred to the Central Government, or were
transformed into government agencies. The Central Government provided
through the PROES up to 100 per cent of the resources to support the
restructuring, but only up to 50 per cent in those few cases in which banks
remained under the State Government control, as was the case of the Banrisul
and Nossa Caixa (see below).
The restructuring process led to a higher degree of banking concentration and
foreign ownership. Total assets held by the 10 largest banks went up from 
52 per cent in 1999 to 62 per cent in 2001 and 66 per cent in mid-2004 (see
Table 4.4 in the next section). The share of the foreign banks in the system’s
total assets increased from 7.5 per cent in 1994 to 23 per cent in 1999 and then
22.5 per cent in 2001 (see Table 4.2, also in the next section). 
Furthermore, Brazil also has the public federal banks, two of which are among
the largest financial institutions in the country which, similarly to many private
banks and public banks at the State level, were in poor financial shape. In
response to that, these banks were also re-capitalised to be able to comply with
the new capital requirements, although they were not privatised. 
The Banco do Brasil – the largest bank in Brazil – was recapitalised in 1996, as
part of a broader restructuring process that led to new management – and
again in 2001, when only by then was the bank able to meet Basel I minimum
capital requirements. Today, the bank has its capital adequacy levels at 15.6 per
cent. The Caixa Economica, a public bank that is also very large and that 
operates in the housing, sewage and infrastructure segments, went through a
similar restructuring process to that adopted for the Banco do Brasil. But the
bank’s pathway towards compliance was even steeper, as the insolvency levels of
its portfolio and its capital and provisioning deficiencies were of considerable
magnitude at the early stage of the process. The bank was finally brought in line
with Basel I capital requirements in 2001.
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8 The PROES also had a clear political purpose. It was motivated by the diagnosis that 
public banks constituted a source of monetary and fiscal profligacy. This was explained 
by the existence of political pressures from State Governments for their controlled 
banks to lend to them (despite the existence of legal restrictions for banks to lend to 
their controllers), and their subsequent inability to service the debt, which was in the 
end re-financed by the Central Government to protect the overall stability of the 
financial system.
Among the development banks, the Banco do Nordeste do Brasil (BNB) was
also recapitalised in 2001, which helped the bank increase its capital ratio to
16.2 per cent in the same year, and to 22.6 per cent in 2003. In 2002, the
Banco da Amazonia (BASA) was in turn recapitalised, reaching the capital ratio
of 52 per cent in mid-2004. The two major banks at the State levels that
remained under control of the State Governments despite the PROES –
Banrisul and Nossa Caixa, Nosso Banco – experienced a similar adjustment
process. Banrisul (controlled by the State of Rio Grande do Sul) and Nossa
Caixa, Nosso Banco (controlled by the São Paulo State) were cleaned and
recapitalised, with 50 per cent of the resources coming from the State
Governments, and 50 per cent from the Central Government. As a result,
Banrisul reached a capital ratio of 19 per cent in 2002 (although that declined
to 11 per cent thereafter as a result of rapid credit expansion) and Nossa Caixa a
ratio of 25 per cent.
The private banks (national and foreign) in turn, also adjusted their capital levels
to meet the Basel I requirements. This, together with the recapitalisation of
those parts of the system that were in poor shape at the beginning of the
process, led to a gradual increase in the system’s capital level as a whole, 
reaching the level of 18 per cent in December 2003. 
The country’s compliance with Basel I and the broader restructuring process
have altered dramatically the regulatory and financial system landscapes in Brazil.
Each of these elements was part of an agenda of reforms that contributed 
significantly to the improved solidity of the financial system. That is a view
broadly shared in Brazil, from top regulators to private and public bank 
representatives, and financial consultants. 
The positive assessment is tempered by some sectors of the banking community
in Brazil, particularly in regard to the Basel rules. Whilst recognising concrete
benefits stemming from Basel I, such as the development of a credit risk 
assessment culture, some bankers from the public sector warn that the specific
Basel rule on capital requirement is likely to affect public institutions’ lending
capacity. In the specific case of development banks, some argue that these
banks should not be subject to the Basel capital requirements, since their
liability structure is based on compulsory savings, not bank deposits, and that
compliance with Basel is therefore not only unnecessary but counter-
productive. Its implementation has the (admittedly unintended) effect of
restricting these banks’ capacity to support financing for developmental 
projects, which are at the heart of their mission. For this reason, in their view
the homogeneous treatment given across private and public banks that differ in
their liability structures and purposes should be reviewed.
But how have the implementation of Basel I, and the reforms more broadly,
affected the levels of credit in the country?
Figure 4.1 in the next section shows that total credit as a proportion of the
country’s GDP declined gradually between 1994 and early this century.
However, the majority view held in Brazil is that Basel I did not affect the total
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level of the country’s credit, or even credit to the rural sectors, the micro-
enterprises or SMEs. The reason provided is that historically, credit to the private
sector has been very limited in Brazil – at around 25 per cent – and that other
factors explain better why this is so. These include high levels of public financing
requirements, which makes government bonds the most important asset held
by banks; the country’s macroeconomic conditions characterised by high levels
of interest rates and spreads (which did not come down with the entry of
foreign banks in the system), high insolvency levels among private borrowers,
the existence of government taxes (what Brazilians call the ‘fiscal wedge’), high
levels of deposit rates with the Central Bank, and bankruptcy law and a judiciary
system that are tilted towards the interests of the debtors.
This study contests this view. Although it accepts that a number of factors
explain why credit has historically been so low in Brazil, the fact is that it has
declined even further since 1994, and Basel I seems to have played an important
role in it. An evidence of this is that the share of credit in banks’ total assets
declined sharply between 1994 and 2004. This evidence is consistent with
recent simulations run by Barrel and Gottschalk (2005) using a macro-
econometric model for Brazil, which shows that an increase in banks’ minimum
capital requirements brings about a fall in banks’ credit to the private sector, and
an increase in the levels of government bonds held by banks. The shift in 
portfolio assets composition happens because whilst credit to the private sector
has risk weight of 100 per cent for capital requirement purposes under Basel
rules, government bonds have a 0 per cent weight – that is, these assets are
risk-free. One might argue that the shift in banks’ portfolio towards 
government bonds was due to high interest rates. But a similar shift in banks’
portfolio took place in India following the adoption of Basel I in that country,
under very different macroeconomic circumstances. 
There is thus strong evidence suggesting that credit was indeed affected by the
Basel capital rules. If credit was not so more affected, this was due to the fact
that efforts towards meeting the minimum capital requirements took place
mainly through banks’ re-capitalisation, as indicated earlier, thereby reducing the
need for credit cuts or cuts in the riskier types of credit.
As regards credit allocation, it is difficult to judge what happened to credit to
SMEs or the poor, due to lack of information. But for rural credit information is
available. It shows that rural credit patterns are strongly determined by directed
credit schemes, which has historically been a key government policy instrument
in support of the rural sector. This policy instrument clearly has countervailed
any negative impacts Basel I may have had on rural credit. 
3.3 The New Basel Capital Accord – Basel II
The main purpose of the New Basel Capital Accord approved in June 2004 is
to further strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking
system, through encouraging banks to improve their risk management practices.
To the extent that various internationally active banks have been adopting 
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internal models to assess different types of risks, the new accord’s intent is to
align the rules that determine capital allocation with what has been already
practised in the markets. 
The new framework has three mutually reinforcing pillars: (1) the minimum 
capital requirement, (2) the supervisory review and (3) market discipline. Pillars 2
and 3 relate closely to the Basel Committee’s Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision (BCP). But in this new context in which new risk 
management systems are encouraged for adoption, emphasis is put on 
supervising the quality of banks’ new systems for risk assessment, and on 
disclosure of information on risk management practices, and on different types
of risk exposures, along with disclosure of other types of information, such as
banks’ financial performance and financial position (Basel 2004).
But the main novelty and challenges for banks and regulators worldwide 
concern the new rules under Pillar 1 for capital requirements. The minimum
capital adequacy level at 8 per cent recommended by Basel I is maintained, but
three different approaches are suggested for determining the risk for different
types of assets: the standardised approach, the foundation internal risk based
(IRB) approach and the advanced IRB approach. Under the standardised
approach, different risk levels can be assigned to different categories of assets,
and the approach allows for external rating agencies to determine risk levels.
The basic and advanced IRB approaches differ from the standardised approach in
that they require the use of internal modeling techniques to measure risk. The
difference between the latter two approaches is that under the foundation IRB
approach banks can use their own models to determine default risk, but the
parameters for loss given default is furnished by the regulatory authorities. In
the case of the advanced IRB approach, banks are allowed to determine
through their modeling techniques and database both default risk and the loss
given default.
In addition, the new accord requires the allocation of capital for operational risk
(in addition to credit, market risks, international exposure and other risks), and
proposes three methods for measuring this type of risk: the basic indicator
method, the standard indicator method, and the advanced measurement
method. 
The new framework has been designed for adoption by the G-10, and the Basel
committee expects that these countries will be ready to implement the 
framework by the beginning of 2007. At the same time, the Basel Committee
recognises that many non-G-10 countries worldwide may wish to adapt the
new framework to their own national realities and circumstances, and to have
their own timetable for adopting the new rules.9 The Committee goes further
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9 In this regard, the Basel Committee set up a Working Group in 2003 composed of
representatives from mainly non-G-10 countries, including Brazil, to assess Basel II and 
provide recommendations on how supervisors might want to promote changes 
towards the new framework (Basel 2004).
to say that national regulators should aim to ensure the regulatory systems in
their countries meet certain pre-conditions before attempting to implement
the new framework in its entirety. They specifically recommend a sequencing
approach, in which national regulators should aim for strengthening the 
country’s regulatory infrastructure through the implementation of the Pillars 2
and 3, which deal with supervisory systems and market discipline, as just 
mentioned; only when these Pillars are firmly in place, should they focus on
Pillar 1. This suggested approach reflects a main concern that many countries
face limited resource capacity (human, financial) to implement Basel II, and that
efforts to adopt the Pillar 1 may have the undesirable effect of diverting
resources needed to ensure a satisfactory level of compliance with the BCP,
many elements of which are embodied in the Pillars 2 and 3. 
The new framework was approved after several rounds of consultations and
debates that involved numerous stakeholders such as financial market 
participants, senior policymakers (national, international), national regulators and
academics. In this consultative process, in addition to capacity limitation, a 
number of other issues were raised in relation to the proposed framework. For
the purpose of this study, we highlight the following:
1 inequity leading to banking concentration;
2 loan portfolio concentration;
3 and pro-cyclicality.
1 Inequity leading to banking concentration
The inequity issue had been raised before by the Basel Committee when Basel I
was created. Their concern was that if Basel I did not ensure a minimum degree
of homogeneity of rules across different jurisdictions, this could grant 
competitive advantage to internationally active banks based in certain 
jurisdictions against banks based in others. The point was that if rules were
applied differently across different jurisdictions, some banks would end up facing
higher capital requirements than others. There was the further risk that these
differences could be magnified by specific tax, accounting and other rules across
jurisdictions.
Basel II provides a menu of options for calculating capital charges, and this can
also cause the inequity problem mentioned above, of banks working with 
different levels of capital requirements. But in this case that would happen not
only among banks across countries but also within countries. For example, in a
same jurisdiction there could be banks adopting the IRB approach along with
others adopting the standardised approach. But those banks adopting the IRB
approach would be at advantage in relation to the others. This is because the
IRB approach is likely to result in lower levels of capital requirements. The larger
and more sophisticated banks are more likely to adopt the IRB approach and
therefore to benefit from it, in detriment to smaller banks, which are more
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likely to adopt the standardised approach. This type of inequity could, in turn,
lead to banking concentration favouring the bigger banks, and in the case of
many developing countries, it could favour the foreign banks.
2 Loan portfolio concentration
The use of risk measurement techniques to determine the amount of capital to
be allocated for different types of assets is likely to result in both more 
expensive and rationed credit to borrowers perceived as of higher risk, and
more and cheaper credit to borrowers perceived as of lower risk. For reasons
such as information asymmetry, small borrowers such as SMEs are likely to be
judged as of higher risk than the larger ones, such as large companies. This can
cause a concentration in banks’ loan portfolio away from small borrowers and
towards the larger companies. Moreover, portfolio concentration implies that
risk is being concentrated thereby making financial institutions more vulnerable
to shocks and unexpected changing circumstances. This goes against the 
intended objective of regulatory measures, which is to reduce risks and 
vulnerabilities to which banks are normally exposed. 
3 Pro-cyclicality
The use of risk-sensitive models under the IRB approach is bound to result in
these models detecting an increase in the probability of default during 
economic downturns. As a consequence, the assets of a portfolio will be 
downgraded – what is called migration – which in turn will lead to higher
capital charges. Recent empirical evidence supports the claim that the use of
the IRB approach to measure risk may have the effect of a higher variation in
the capital charge over the business cycle, as compared to the use of Basel I
type of rules for measuring risk (see Goodhart and Segoviano 2005). This in
itself may lead to both increased cost and reduced quantity of credit.
Furthermore, the fact that it is harder to raise capital during economic
downturns may reinforce the tendency in credit reduction, ultimately leading to
a credit crunch and a deepening of the economic downturn, with further
impacts on banks’ portfolios.
A reason why the measured risk by these models tends to be so much time-
variant is that even when they are forward-looking, their time horizons often
are limited to one year (see Borio et al. 2003). These models therefore result in
assigning borrowers ratings in light of their current (or over a limited time-
horizon) status. That is what is called the ‘point-in-time’ approach. But if models
could instead look ‘through-the-cycle’, so as to reduce or eliminate variations in
the ratings caused by changing conditions during the cycle, then their pro-
cyclicality effects could be avoided or at least significantly reduced. 
An additional problem is that Basel II, by encouraging different banks to use
similar models – VAR models – could exacerbate pro-cyclicality even further, as
banks would behave and react in similar ways to the same events (Persaud
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2000; Danielsson et al. 2001). In times of financial crises, their effects could be
magnified throughout the system.10
The potential problems of inequity (i.e. banking concentration) and portfolio
concentration show that regulatory measures are not neutral, that they can
have an important impact on competitive and equity issues. Moreover, they can
exacerbate pro-cyclicality of bank credit and thereby contribute to larger swings
in the business cycle. The latter problem in particular should be a concern for
regulators, as it also has a bearing on the stability of the financial system.
Indeed, accentuated macroeconomic volatility is a major factor underlying 
banking crises, due to sharp variations in key prices, such as exchange and 
interest rates, and therefore in banks’ balance sheets. 
In what follows we will provide an assessment of to what extent Brazil fulfils
the pre-conditions the Basel Committee has indicated, and whether the 
country’s banking regulators, and more broadly financial market participants and
academics, are showing concern, and indicating solutions, to the problems we
have just highlighted.
3.3.1 Does Brazil fulfil the pre-conditions as recommended by the
Basel Committee?
Brazil’s compliance with C&S in the area of banking supervision is in good
shape, including supervisory and monitoring capacity. Moreover, a new loan
classification system, a central risk information system and an internal control
system have been introduced, which are steps that respond to the specific
concerns of Pillars 2 and 3 with regard to supervisory processes and market 
discipline.11 More broadly, the financial system has been strengthened as a result
of the restructuring process. Today the system is financially solid and meets
comfortably the capital adequacy levels as established by the Central Bank. All
these factors combined – strengthened supervision and financial position of the
banking system – provide a platform for Brazil’s banking regulators to take steps
towards implementing the Pillar 1 on capital requirements of the new capital
accord. 
In line with this broadly positive assessment, Brazil’s regulators have established
the procedures for implementing Basel II, with particular attention to Pillar 1.12
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10 On this point, the Financial Times editorial of 22 February 2005 also calls attention to 
a survey of financial opinion conducted by the Centre for the Study of Financial 
Innovation (CSFI) in 54 countries, which shows that business respondents differentiate 
between ‘banking risk’, which is the focus of Basel II, and the safety of financial 
institutions, which can be threatened by systemic risk, which could increase as a result 
of the use of similar risk assessment models by banks.
11 The report International Codes and Standards and Development Finance: A Case Study of 
Brazil, prepared for DFID provides a detailed discussion on Brazil’s compliance with C&S
in the area of banking supervision – see Gottschalk and Sodré (2005).
At the same time, in recognition that it is important to adapt the new frame-
work to Brazil’s specific conditions, a phased approach, consisting of five steps,
has been proposed. That is, the regulatory authorities established a chronogram
that covers a period of 7 years – from 2005 to 2011 – for the full implement-
ation of the New Accord. In addition, they established that those banks with
significant weight in the domestic financial system and with international 
exposure will be permitted to adopt the foundation IRB approach (and the
advanced IRB approach at the end of the transitional process as well), while the
remaining banks will have to adopt the standardised approach. The standardised
approach will not draw on external ratings for determining credit risk. It will
consist of an upgrading of the current approach, with the incorporation of risk
mitigation instruments. The same rules will be applied to national and foreign
banks. Table 3.2 provides detailed information on the chronogram proposed for
Basel II in Brazil.
Table 3.2 Basel II in Brazil – announced chronogram for
implementation
Source: Brazil Central Bank’s Communication No 12.746 of 8 December 2004.
The adoption of the phased approach for the transition from the current to the
new framework (whose time span goes considerably beyond the deadline 
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12 See Brazil Central Bank’s Communication No. 12.746 (8 December 2004).
Period Measures/action
Until end of 2005 Review of capital requirements for credit risk under
the standardised approach; new capital requirements
for those market risks still not covered by current rules;
impact studies regarding operational risk.
Until end of 2007 Eligibility criteria for adoption of the IRB approach for
credit risk and internal models for market risk assess-
ment; capital requirement for operational risk.
2008–2009 Validation of models for assessing market risk; 
chronogram for validating the use of the foundation
IRB approach; initial validation of the IRB approach and
criteria for the adoption of internal models for
operational risk.
2009–2010 Validation of the advanced IRB approach for credit risk
and chronogram for the advanced approach for
operational risk.
2010–2011 Validation of internal models for operational risk.
established by the Basel Committee for the G-10), the limitation of the IRB
approach to the larger and internationally exposed banks, and the non-use of
external ratings under the standardised approach, are factors that together
reveal an intention by regulators to be cautious. This in all probability reflects a
view that Brazil’s banks and the regulators themselves still need a considerable
amount of time to become ready for the IRB approach. 
The proposed approach is broadly consistent with what Brazil’s top regulators
had indicated during our interviews on what they would do. First, that only the
larger banks – in the regulators’ words, between 12 and 15 – would be 
permitted to adopt the IRB approach at some stage, thus following the US
approach to Basel II. Second, that the standardised approach to be adopted by
the majority of banks would be indigenised to suit better Brazil’s needs. Third,
that the basic indicator method whereby capital charge for operation risk should
be calculated as a percentage (e.g. of 15 per cent) over the banks’ gross revenues
would be adopted – although as we can see the proposed approach indicates
that this will be the case only during the first years, as a timetable exists for the
adoption of internal models for measuring operational risk. Finally, all banks,
public and private, and regardless of their liability structure or mission, would be
subject to Basel II rules. 
The phased approach that Brazil’s regulators have proposed for adoption looks
appropriate for a developing country where banks probably need time,
resources and capacity building to be able to adopt Basel II in full. However, the
proposed framework lacks any countervailing mechanisms or instruments to
address any of the issues outlined above – of banking concentration, portfolio
concentration away from SMEs and increased pro-cyclicality. All these issues
have clear macroeconomic and systemic dimensions that are lacking appropriate
acknowledgement by Brazil’s regulators.
This begs the question of whether Brazil’s regulators, in not addressing the
three issues just mentioned, are not excessively focused on micro-prudential
risks (e.g. the risk facing individual banks), but not paying sufficient attention to
macro risks, such as shocks or large swings in the business cycle, which are
common to the whole banking system (Borio et al. 2003). Macro risks can be
exacerbated by a banking system that has concentrated portfolios and that uses
risk models that accentuate credit pro-cyclicality. 
3.3.2 Views of the private sector (and academics) and what steps they
are taking
A large number of financial market participants were interviewed (both private
and public).13 The questions asked included: how are they preparing themselves
for the new framework? Are they considering adopting the IRB approach?
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13 Most interviews were conducted in July and August 2004.
What challenges will they face in the process? How do they think Basel II may
affect the financial system? What will be the welfare impact?
The private sector sees the adoption of Basel II rules in Brazil as a positive 
development. It believes it will lead to a strengthened capacity by banks to
assess and manage different types of risk and as a result contribute to the 
solidity of the banking system. 
The largest banks are already taking steps to adopt the internal models to assess
credit risk, and to measure operational risk. The three largest private banks –
Bradesco, Itaú and Unibanco – have already established Directorships of Risk
Management, charged with the developments of both credit and operational
risk management models, and specifically in regard to credit risk, their
expectation is to be able to adopt the advanced IRB approach. They expect that
their credit risk models will be up and running until the end of 2006. 
Like the larger banks, the medium-sized banks have expressed interest in 
adopting internal models for both credit and operational risk, but accepted that
whether they will be able to use these models will depend on permission being
granted by the regulatory and supervisory authorities.
Brazilian banks perceive as a major challenge how best to address operational
risk – specifically how to quantify this kind of risk, and the necessary capital
required to protect against it. Although a good deal of losses arising from 
operational risk is clearly identified by banks – losses associated with labour and
civil litigation and frauds, a whole universe of unidentifiable losses still exists,
making their measurement very difficult.
3.3.3 Views of the public banks and what steps they are taking
A good number of Brazilian banks still remain public despite the banking
restructuring and banking privatisation in the past few years. These are mainly
federal banks with large retail base and development banks, although a few
state-level banks still exist (see section above). All of them are taking steps to be
prepared for the new capital rules. Like the private banks, the largest retail 
public banks hold a favourable view of Basel II, and believe that these rules
should be adopted in Brazil in its entirety to the benefit of the financial system.
The new instruments of risk and managerial controls and increased transparency
are seen as positive developments, among other reasons because they can 
contribute to reduced political influence on lending decisions and thereby to
greater efficiency.
But a number of medium-sized and development banks hold a more cautious
position. Whilst acknowledging certain benefits, such as the strengthening of a
risk management culture, they point to the operational difficulties in imple-
menting Basel II, the high costs involved especially for the smaller banks, the
potential conflict between new supervisory control on managerial practices and
the social purpose of certain lending programmes, and the impact of capital
requirement for operational risks on the cost and level of credit. Moreover, they
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acknowledge the fact that the new rules may constrain credit to the group of
borrowers perceived as of higher risk, which typically are the small businesses. 
There is therefore a much higher degree of heterogeneity of views among 
public banks than among private banks, and within the former group this
reflects a divide along the lines of size and nature of the banking activity.
The largest retail bank in Brazil – Banco do Brasil (BB) – takes a favourable view
about Basel II, and is seen as leading the process in developing internal risk
assessment models both for credit and operational risk. As regards credit risk,
they claim to be at a considerably advanced stage in developing a model and
believe that this will be ready for use by 2007. They are also investing a 
considerable amount of resources in developing a VAR model to measure 
operational risk, and in preparing the database, which will have a 5-year period
coverage by 2007.
Other banks are also taking steps to be prepared for Basel II. The public banks at
the state level are improving the managerial practices of their credit portfolios,
through upgrading their credit risk assessment models and pursuing modeling
design for operational risk. They intend to adopt internal risk models in the
future and are hoping to have them fully developed and tested by 2007. Other
banks have only recently created risk departments, and therefore are running
behind other banks in developing risk assessment models, particularly for
operational risk, and in building the required database, admittedly a task of great
complexity, especially for medium-sized and small banks, which face high fixed
costs in relation to the scale of their operations.
The public federal banks other than the BB – Caixa Economica, Banco da
Amazonia (BASA), Banco do Nordeste do Brasil (BNB), are also attempting to
improve their risk assessment systems, and intend to adopt internal models for
credit and operational risk assessment. Given their limited internal capacity, they
are working on these areas with the assistance of external consultancies. But
even with external help, they point to the difficulties they face in taking these
steps. A particular difficulty relates to how to map and quantify operational risk,
and especially how to disentangle operational risks from other types of risk,
including credit risk. Some institutions also fear the risk of investing in the
development of internal models for risk assessment, but not having them 
validated by the Central Bank.
Both groups of banks – federal and state-level ones – share a number of
concerns. In addition to their difficulties in developing and putting in practice
new risk assessment models, and the costs that these tasks involve, especially
for the smaller banks, they raise a number of other points that need to be
addressed. 
First, they believe the use of internal risk models will imply less capital require-
ment, and that if they end up not adopting these models they will find them-
selves at disadvantage in relation to those banks adopting them, as it will imply
allocating higher levels of capital and therefore higher costs. A recent study by
Carneiro et al. (2004) based on simulations for Brazil, shows that the use of the
IDS WORKING PAPER 273
27
IRB approach by banks would, for the majority of banks, imply a reduction in
capital requirements between 0 per cent and 40 per cent. For a few banks, the
needs would be reduced even more, by up to 82 per cent. This indicates that
the risk envisaged here, of a few banks gaining substantial competitive 
advantage through use of the IRB approach, is very real.
Second, banks are worried that the capital requirement for operational risk, by
increasing the banks’ total capital requirement, will lead to higher costs, which
are likely to be reflected in more expensive credit. The larger banks might be
permitted to adopt the standardised model at some point, which means 
measuring risk by type of business and thus requiring less capital. But the 
smaller banks will have little alternative but to adopt the basic indicator method
(i.e. capital required corresponding to 15 per cent of banks’ gross revenues) and
therefore will face higher capital requirements, both in absolute terms and 
relative to other banks adopting a more advanced method. There are therefore
two problems arising from the need to allocate capital for operational risk: 
(1) overall higher level of capital requirements with banks facing higher costs as a
result,14 and (2) the competitive effect affecting negatively those banks adopting
the simplest approach.
Third, some of these banks (especially the retail ones at the state level) believe
they have a relatively homogeneous portfolio of clients to which credit 
extension is in many cases consigned, which reduces the credit risk they face.
Their current risk controls may not be among the most sophisticated ones, but
are deemed as sufficient in light of their customer profile. However, to the
extent they attempt to expand their client base to include clients with different
and riskier profiles, they fear that the new risk control systems will inhibit this
process from taking off. That is, the system will delimit the sorts of products
offered by the bank and therefore affect its business activities. There would thus
be a heightened conflict between different areas of the bank. This indicates that
elements of Pillar 2, such as stricter supervisory controls and monitoring, are
likely to restrain credit expansion policies. (In relation to Pillar 3, banks have
pointed out that there is a need to clarify better what sort of information
needs to be disclosed, and within that, to clearly separate strategic information
and information that can be made available to the markets. The underlying 
concern is that excessive information disclosure might be harmful to banks and
the system as a whole.)
Fourth, public banks have a social mission. In line with that, many of their
lending programmes derive from Federal and State level social policies. But the
New Basel rules are likely to exacerbate the tension between profit maximising
and social objectives, as the latter should be expected to involve activities
deemed as of higher risk. As it is put in a IADB report, ‘[p]ressures for prof-
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14 It has been noted that banks adopting the IRB approach for credit risk could end up 
requiring less capital for this type of risk, thus offsetting the added capital for
operational risk. But banks adopting the standardised approach would not be able to 
generate this balancing effect – see IADB (2005, chapter 16).
itability may induce public bank managers to deviate from their social mandate
and mimic private banks in their credit allocation criteria’ (IADB 2004: 144,
footnote 8, based on De La Torre 2002). Moreover, the new rules may also
constrain the ability of public banks to play a counter-cyclical role, when
needed.15
A final point that relates closely to the previous one is that development banks,
such as the BNDES, BASA, BNB and BDMG, believe they should be given a 
differentiated treatment. They recognise that the recent restructuring process
involving cleaning and recapitalisation provided public banks with conditions to
compete with private banks on an equal basis, but they firmly believe there is a
need to recognise the specific features of development banks, such as their
distinct liability structure and their development financing role. Accordingly, it
would be important to make the C&S related rules more flexible to this group
of banks. That could include a lower capital adequacy requirement, whose 
minimum level in Brazil is higher at 11 per cent compared with the 8 per cent
determined by the Basel Committee for the G-10. The BNDES goes further to
propose that the bank should not be subject to the New Accord, partly due to
its liability structure based on compulsory savings, partly because its lending
operations consist in large measure of passing resources on to other financial
institutions (banks and development agencies) which are the ones that 
ultimately bear the risk.
The banks’ views are that there is a lack of debate in the country on a number
of important issues, such as the need for differentiated treatment across the
banking system, and the impact of Basel II on the system and on credit provision
in particular. There is a feeling that Brazil’s regulators have missed the opportu-
nity to raise these issues more forcefully in international fora and with the Basel
Committee. There is a debate of some of these issues domestically within the
Febraban, as well as at national and international fora, but this has been limited.
It is therefore felt that more needs to be done. 
Thus, the views between the private sector and public banks on the potential
benefits but especially costs of Basel II diverge fairly significantly. This divergence
reflects their differences in terms of size, capacity to adopt more advanced risk
assessment approaches, and their nature and purpose. But a particular concern
that emerges very strongly and that reflects public banks’ social concerns is that
credit can be affected by Basel II rules through a variety of mechanisms.
Unfortunately, this aspect has received very little attention so far.
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15 This point has been made mainly by academics. Moreover, an IADB study presents 
evidence that public banks in Latin America are less pro-cyclical than private banks in 
extending credit (IADB 2004: 23 and chapter 11).
4 C&S and trends in the financial 
system in Brazil
This section discusses in more detail some of the points raised or explored only
to a limited extent in the third section: what impact has Basel I had on the
structure of the financial system? Has it affected the levels of credit, and if so,
to what sectors? To what extent have institutional factors helped counter-bal-
ance the negative effects of Basel I? 
4.1 General trends and the current structure of the financial 
system
The financial system in Brazil has undergone major changes in the past two
decades. Between 1988 and 1994 – that is, a period of just 6 years – the 
number of banks increased from 106 to 246. Since the mid-1990s, however, a
steady decline in the number of banks has taken place, reaching the total of 164
banks in 2003 (see Table 4.1). Thus, in a space of just 15 years or so, two marked
trends were observed: an upward one between 1988 and 1994, and a declining
one between 1995 and 2003. 
The increase in the number of banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s can be
attributed to the government’s decision undertaken in 1988 to allow financial
non-banking institutions to become banks, and to permit commercial and
investment banks to become universal banks.16 The number of banks, which
jumped from 106 to 179 between 1988 and 1989, and continued to increase
steadily in the early 1990s, was a phenomenon that can in addition be explained
by an environment of high inflation, which permitted banks to expand in size
and numbers through a business strategy that combined low loan levels with
high profits derived from the high inflation-related revenues. 
But the upward trend was reversed from 1995 onwards. As seen earlier, the
reversal in the trend has been the result of the banking restructuring process,
driven by a government aiming to strengthen the banking sector through the
recapitalisation, mergers and acquisitions, privatisation and the entry of foreign
banks. An underlying component of this process was the government’s adoption
of prudential regulation determining minimum capital requirements for banks
(Basel I). 
The restructuring process undertaken from 1995 onwards changed the owner-
ship structure of the banking system, with the number of public banks declining
from 32 to 14 between 1995 and 2003, and of private national banks from 172
to 88. During the same period, the number of foreign banks increased from 38
to 62 (see Table 4.1).17
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16 See Resolution 1.524 of 21 September 1988, from the Central Bank of Brazil. Also, as 
Troster (2004) observes, Brazil’s 1988 Constitution reduced barriers to entry.
Table 4.1 Number of banks in Brazil 1988–2003
Selected years
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. (1) Includes national banks with foreign participation. 
(2) Includes foreign banks’ branches in Brazil.
Table 4.2 Participation of banks in the banking system’s total
assets 1995–2004 %
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. (1) Includes national banks with foreign participation. 
(2) Includes foreign banks’ branches in Brazil.
The reduction in the number of public banks was reflected in a substantial fall in
the share of their assets in the banking system’s total assets, from 52 per cent
in 1995 to 34 per cent in 2004. Despite the decline in their numbers, the 
percentage share of private national banks in the total assets of the banking 
system went up from 39 per cent to 42 per cent during the same period.
Among foreign banks, their assets’ share went up from 8.7 per cent to 22 per
cent (see Table 4.2).18
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17 For an analysis of the growing foreign ownership of Brazil’s banking system, see 
Carvalho (2001).
18 In truth, the share of assets held by private banks went first down to 33 per cent in 
1999, and then up to 42 per cent in 2004, while of foreign banks went up to 30 per
cent in 2001, and down to 22 per cent in 2004. These inflexions were due to 
purchases of foreign banks by domestic ones, as the former started leaving the country 
due to fierce competition.
Year 1988 1989 1990 1992 1994 1995 1998 2001 2003
Total 106 179 216 234 246 242 204 182 164
Public banks 32 22 15 14
Private nation-
al banks1
172 123 95 88
Foreign 
banks 2
38 59 72 62
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Public banks 52.2 50.9 50.1 45.3 43.0 36.6 32.0 34.7 37.2 34.4
Private national
banks 1
38.9 38.3 36.8 35.3 33.1 35.2 37.2 36.9 40.8 41.7
Foreign banks 2 8.7 10.5 12.8 18.4 23.2 27.4 29.9 27.4 20.7 22.4
The sharp decline in the proportion of assets held by public banks reflected
mainly a steep fall in the share of assets of the state-level banks, from 21.9 per
cent in 1995 to 5.2 per cent in 2004. Of course, this was the result of the fact
that nearly all such banks were either closed or privatised during the period, as
discussed earlier. At the same time, the federal public bank Banco do Brasil,
witnessed an increase in its percentage share from 13.9 per cent to 17.4 per
cent, while the other large federal public bank, Caixa Economica, had its share
declined from 16.4 per cent to 11.5 per cent (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 Participation of different categories of public banks in
the banking system’s total assets 1995–2004 %
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. 
The reduction in the total number of banks also led to a higher degree of
banking concentration in the system. Between 1999 and mid-2004, the 
percentage of assets held by the largest 10 banks in the total assets of the
financial system went up from 52 per cent to 66 per cent; when the largest 
20 banks are considered, the percentage of assets went up from 62 per cent to
77 per cent (see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4 The largest banks in Brazil 2000–2004
% of total assets 1
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. (1) Excludes BNDES. Years 2003 and 2004 also exclude
Volkswagen, BRDE, GM and CNH Capital. Excluding these latter banksfor the years up to
2002 alter the results only marginally. For the years 2001 and 2002, the 50th largest bank
was assumed to hold the same value of assets as the 49th largest bank.
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Public state-level
banks
21.9 21.9 19.1 11.4 10.2 5.6 4.3 5.9 5.8 5.2
Banco do Brasil 13.9 12.5 14.4 17.4 15.8 15.6 16.8 17.1 18.4 17.4
Caixa Economica
Federal
16.4 16.5 16.6 17.0 17.1 15.4 11.0 11.7 13.0 11.5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Jun/2004
Largest 10 52.0 59.8 62.1 65.5 67.6 66.1
Largest 20 61.7 74.6 75.3 77.2 76.9 76.8
Largest 50 Nd 83.8 85.1 84.7 82.9 83.0
The trend in banking concentration is less clear when measured by credit 
operations. In national terms, the trend points to the opposite direction. For
the largest 10 and 20 banks, their share in the total credit operations in the
financial system declined slightly between 1999 and mid-2004. For the largest
50 banks, it declined more pronouncedly between 2000 and mid-2004 (see
Table 4.5). These findings are similar to those obtained by Troster (2004) – 
concentration of assets and de-concentration of credit between 1999 and
2003, and between 1994 and 2003 as well, using the Herfindahl index to
measure banking concentration.
Table 4.5 The largest banks in Brazil 2000–2004 
% of total credit operations 1
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. (1) Excludes BNDES. Years 2003 and 2004 also exclude
Volkswagen, BRDE, GM and CNH Capital. Excluding these latter banks for the years up to
2002 alter the results only marginally. For the years 2000–2002, the 50th largest bank was
assumed to hold the same value of assets as the 49th largest bank.
The process of concentration in the past 10 years or so follows one of strong
deconcentration, between 1980 and 1993 (see Rodriguez de Paula 1998).
In regional terms, a clear trend in credit concentration can be observed. For the
north and north-east regions, which are the smallest regions in terms of bank
deposits and credit operations, and the poorest ones in terms of income per
capita levels, the decline in credit operations between 1997 and 2003 was from
1.9 per cent to 1.4 per cent and from 13.6 per cent to 6.2 per cent, respectively
(see Table 4.6). For the Centre-West region, the decline was from 12.3 per cent
to 8.7 per cent. By contrast, the south-east and south regions, the wealthiest
ones in income per capita terms, witnessed an increase in credit operations in
the period 1997–2003 from 59.4 per cent to 70.9 per cent and from 12.7 per
cent to 12.8 per cent, respectively. Interestingly, regional concentration has not
happened when measured by level of deposits, which increased for the north
and centre-west regions, and declined only slightly for the north-east region
(see also Table 4.6).
Thus, the restructuring of the banking system from 1995 onwards led to (1) a
significant reduction in the number of banks operating in the country (2) a
reduction in the public sector participation in the banking system (when 
measured by share of assets in total assets), (3) an increase in the participation
of private domestic and especially foreign banks; and (4) a higher level of
banking concentration, both in terms of asset holdings by the largest 10 and 20
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Jun/2004
Largest 10 67.4 65.9 61.3 63.2 65.1 66.0
Largest 20 77.8 78.5 75.4 75.1 73.6 74.6
Largest 50 Nd 85.6 84.2 82.2 77.3 78.7
banks, and in terms of regional credit distribution. As regards the latter, the
concentration of credit away from the poorest regions and towards the richest
ones was quite dramatic. The lack of concentration of credit by the largest
banks might be explained by the sharp reduction in credit by the Caixa
Economica Federal (which has figured among the largest 10 banks over the
years), from 18.9 per cent in 2000 to 6.2 per cent in mid-2004. It is likely that,
within private banks, credit concentration was the case.
Table 4.6 Participation in total banking deposits and credit 
operations, by regions 1997–2003 % total
Source: Central Bank of Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br)
4.4.1 Where does the financial system stand today?
In June 2004, the total assets of the financial system in Brazil were equivalent
to 87 per cent of the country’s GDP, a proportion that has not varied much in
the last few years, but that was much higher than in 1995, when total assets
reached a low of 48 per cent of the GDP (see Table 4.7). This means that, since
the period of strong adjustment in the financial system in the early period of
the Real plan, the banking system has expanded quite strongly.
Table 4.7 Total assets of the financial system as a proportion of
the GDP
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, and de Paula (1998), Table 5, for the 1989–1997 period. (1)
June 2004.
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Regions 1997 1999 2001 2003
Deposit Credit
opera-
tion
Deposit Credit
opera-
tion
Deposit Credit
opera-
tion
Deposit Credit
opera-
tion
North 1.2 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4
Northeast 7.6 13.6 7.2 9.0 7.1 5.8 6.1 6.2
Southeast 71.3 59.4 69.5 64.2 67.2 72.2 65.9 70.9
South 10.0 12.7 10.6 12.6 10.2 11.2 10.0 12.8
Centre-West 9.9 12.3 11.2 12.8 14.2 9.6 16.7 8.7
Year % Year %
1989 116.7 2001 88.6
1993 148.8 2002 91.5
1994 71.1 2003 85.6
1995 47.6 2004 1 87.4
1997 44.6
Of the total assets held by the banking system, 33.7 per cent were total credit
operations. The other main components of total assets were cash and inter-
bank loans at 14 per cent, bonds and stocks at 26 per cent, and other assets at
22 per cent (see Table 4.8).
Table 4.8 Components of total assets % total
Source: Financial Stability Report, Central Bank of Brazil, various issues.
According to Soares (2002), before the implementation of the Real Plan in
1994, the proportion of credit in the banks’ total asset was constant at around
44 per cent, declining sharply to 33 per cent in 1999. His explanation for this
decline is the adoption of Basel I in 1994, which encouraged banks to move
away from credits and towards acquiring government bonds, whose risk weight
is 0 per cent thereby making it easier to meet the minimum capital require-
ments determined by the new regulatory framework (see below for a further
discussion of this point). The decline in the share of credit in banks’ total assets,
in turn, can help explain why concentration trends measured in assets and cred-
its diverged, as reported earlier.
Thus, since the adoption of the Real plan, one can observe a rapid expansion of
the banking system’s total assets as a proportion of the GDP, but within that a
fall in the participation of credit in total assets. That takes us to the central
question: what has happened with total credit as a proportion of the country’s
GDP since the Real plan?
4.2 The evolution of credit in Brazil since the adoption of Basel I
and before
As of November 2003, total credit in Brazil as a proportion of GDP was at 
26 per cent. This level is fairly low when compared with other countries around
the world. But how does that compare with the long-term levels of credit in
the country, and how has it evolved over time? Tracing this information back to
1990, one can see a similar level of credit. But between these two points in
time, it is also possible to detect an upward increase in credit between 1990
and 1994, from 24 per cent to 36 per cent of the country’s total GDP, and since
then a gradual declining trend down to 26 per cent.
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Jun 2002 Dec 2002 Jun 2003 Dec 2003 Jun 2004
Cash and inter-bank
loans
9.8 13.8 11.4 14.7 13.6
Bonds and stocks 30.3 27.1 27.7 27.5 26.4
Credit operations 30.7 30.1 31.2 33.9 33.7
Permanent assets 6.4 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.8
Other assets 22.8 23.7 24.6 18.9 21.5
Figure 4.1 Credit in Brazil 1990–2004 as a proportion of total
GDP %
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
The decline in credit from 1994–1995 onwards reverses an upward trend until
then. The reversal coincides with the adoption of the Real stabilisation plan, and
is opposed to what analysts expected at the time. The expectations were that,
with stabilisation, banks would lose a major revenue source derived from high
inflation, and would thus expand credit as an alternative. Indeed, that is what
happened in the first few months of the adoption of the Real plan. However,
this process was aborted by the drastic monetary tightening adopted by the
government in response of the Tequila crisis. Since then, the economy has been
hit by a number of shocks – the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis, Brazil’s devalua-
tion of early 1999, and so on. In this context, credit really has never regained a
path of sustained recovery. 
Given that credit declined between 1994–95 and 2004, the next question is:
was this decline uniform across the banking system? 
Turning to the composition of credit between the private and the public
sectors, one will see that the share of credit by the public banks, which were
already on a downward trend in the early 1990s, continued to decline, and quite
sharply, from 62 per cent in 1995 to 31 per cent in 2004. Of course, a good deal
of this decline simply reflects the fact many public banks were either closed or
privatised during the period. At the same time, the share of credit by the 
private banks increased steadily, from 38 per cent to 67 per cent during the
period.
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Figure 4.2 Public and private banks’ share in total credit by the
banking system 1990–2004 %
Source: Cosif, Central Bank of Brazil
In the context of declining credit levels in proportion of the GDP, credit granted
by public banks clearly declined, and quite sharply. But what happened to credit
granted by the private banks?
Figure 4.3 Credit by private and public banks as % GDP
1990–2004
Source: Cosif, Central Bank of Brazil
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If we assume that the proportion of credit by the banking system remained
more or less constant in relation to credit by the financial system as a whole,
then we can cross information from Figures 4.1 and 4.2, and obtain information
of credit by private and public banks as a proportion of total GDP. By doing so,
we can see from Figure 4.3 that credit by private banks, which was on a steep
increase until 1994, declined between 1994 and 1996 (from 14.6 per cent to 
12.8 per cent), and then increased gradually until 2001,reaching nearly 20 per
cent, to fall slightly again until 2004, when it was at 17.3 per cent. Overall, it
went up between 1994 and 2004, although not very much.
As seen earlier, the post-1994 period was a very turbulent one in Brazil, not
least because of the many shocks the economy was subject to. A key feature in
this period has been the high real interest rates in a context of historically low
inflation. This factor, together with a number of other constraints (see previous
section) probably inhibited the expansion of credit in Brazil, which was expected
to take place as a consequence of stabilisation. Moreover, it was a period of
banking restructuring, in which the participation of the public banks in the
banking system was drastically reduced. As a result, credit from this segment
alone was drastically reduced. 
These factors altogether seem sufficiently important to explain why credit did
not expand from 1994 onwards. But, as Soares (2002) argues, not only did
credit not expand, a pre-1994 expansion phase was interrupted in the post-1994
period. In his analysis, credit remained stable in real terms between 1994 and
1999, which is consistent with our data, which shows a decline when measured
as a proportion to a growing GDP. In the face of these developments, what it
seems is that a key factor in explaining why credit did not continue to expand as
expected is the adoption of Basel I in September 1994, which was in itself very
strict and turned even stricter in the subsequent years with additional regulatory
measures adopted by the Central Bank of Brazil.
Basel I was stricter than what was recommended by the Basel Committee, as
initially applied and later amended between 1994 and 1999. First, a minimum
absolute level of capital (which was higher than the prevailing ones) had to be
observed by banks to be able to operate. Second, the minimum capital require-
ments to risk-weighted assets were set at 11 per cent rather than 8 per cent.
Third, swap operations and market risk had to be included in the calculus of
minimum capital requirement as well. Fourth, the risk weight for tax credit, 
initially set at 20 per cent, went up to 300 per cent (Soares 2002).
A good way to see if Basel I had a major impact on credit in Brazil is through
looking at the banks’ credit to total assets ratio. Between 1994 and 1999 this
ratio fell from 44 per cent to 33 per cent (Soares 2002), which was a critical
period of banks’ adjustment to the Basel rules. Moreover, looking at the 
broader period 1994–2004, Table 4.7 shows that total assets of the banking 
system increased from 71.1 per cent to 87.4 per cent of the country’s total GDP,
a huge increase that contrasts drastically with the decline in credit for the 
period, from 36 per cent to 26 per cent. This means that the credit to total
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assets ratio fell from 50.6 per cent to 29.7 per cent (and from 73.5 per cent if
the year 1995 is taken as a base).
Data on the Basel index of capital ratios are not available in aggregate terms for
the 1990s. But for three of the largest five banks in Brazil – Banco do Brasil,
Caixa Economica Federal and Unibanco – data are available both for 1995 – the
first year of Basel in Brazil, and 2004. These are displayed in Table 4.9. The Table
shows that an inverse relationship exists between the Basel index and the 
credit-total assets ratio for all the three banks.
Table 4.9 The Basel Index and the credit-total assets ratio –
selected banks %
Source: Brazil’s Central Bank.
High real interest rates from 1995 onwards may partly explain the change in
banks’ asset composition away from credit, and towards federal government
bonds. But clearly, efforts to comply with Basel I have also certainly been an
important factor in explaining the change in banks’ portfolio composition, as it
induced banks to acquire risk-free government bonds, for which no capital is
necessary for meeting the minimum capital requirements.
The biggest effort of adjustment by banks to the Basel rules occurred mainly in
the second half of the 1990s. For the largest five banks, the Basel Index went
from 9.8 in December 1995 to 12.03 in 1999, and then 13.6 in 2001. 
For the whole banking system, the index, available from December 2001
onwards, showed further increases between then and December 2003, from
16.4 to 19.0 – see Figure 4.4, which displays the trend in the Basel Index for the
Brazilian banking system for this latter period, on a quarterly basis. But, unlike
the previous period, the credit to total assets ratio for the banking system
exhibited stability, remaining at around 30 per cent over the 2001–2003 period. 
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Banco do Brasil Caixa Economica
Federal
Unibanco
Basel
Index
Credit to
assets
ratio
Basel
Index
Credit to
assets
ratio
Basel
Index
Credit to
assets
ratio
Dec 1995 7.9 42.4 9.8 48.8 17.3 30.0
Sep 2004 15.6 31.9 18.4 18.7 15.4 34.9
Figure 4.4 The Basel Index in Brazil Dec 2001–Dec 2003
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
But were trends across banks uniform – that is, with portfolio composition
remaining constant as capital requirements continued to go up, as the overall
data suggests? To see if trends across banks were uniform or not regarding their
portfolio composition over the later period, we tested for the correlation
between the Basel Index and the credit-total assets ratio for the 50 largest
banks in 2001 for the Dec-2001–Sep 2004 period, for which data are available
on a quarterly basis for individual banks.
Changes did occur, and the direction of change across banks was rather mixed,
which conforms with the aggregate pattern of credit-total asset ratio stability,
as trends in opposite directions probably have cancelled each other. But can we
draw a coherent story by grouping the individual banks in broad banking 
categories, and thus looking at trends across these different categories? 
The answer is clearly positive. Among public banks, the correlation is positive for
some, negative for others. Apparently, this was the case because some public
banks succeeded in raising their capital requirements through government 
re-capitalisation. Among foreign banks, a mixed picture is also found; but most
importantly, for the majority of private domestic banks, a negative correlation is
found, which indicates that for this category of banks, further portfolio 
adjustments took place in response to their efforts to further increase their
capital ratios. It would be interesting to extend the exercise to the totality of
private banks, to see if a negative correlation indeed dominates. Moreover, 
further research involving a multi-variable econometric exercise would be 
desirable, to control for the effects of other factors affecting the banks’ 
portfolio composition.
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4.3 Credit allocation across sectors: what has been the impact on
the SMEs and the poor?
In the context of overall credit decline between 1995 and 2004, how was total
credit distributed across sectors? Which sectors increased their share in total
credit, and which sectors lost access to credit?
Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 show respectively how total, private and public credit is
distributed across different sectors of activities, and how distribution shares have
evolved since 1994, when financial reforms started and Basel I was adopted. 
Table 4.10 Total loans from the financial system – distribution by
sectors 1
as percent % of total
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. (1) December – balance end of period. (2) October 2004.
It can be seen from Table 4.10 that the share of total credit from the financial
system to the public sector fell dramatically between 1994 and 2004 – from 
15 per cent to 4 per cent, while the share of credit flowing to the private sector
increased from 85 per cent to 96 per cent over the same period. The decline in
the share of credit to the public sector, in the context of overall decline in 
credit as a percentage of the GDP, can be explained mainly by the reduction of
public banks, which were the main lenders to the public sector, which 
constrained the ability of governments, especially at the sub-national levels, to
borrow from the financial system. This happened along with new fiscal rules
constraining the state-level governments capacity to borrow. The latter is 
evidenced by the fact that lending to the public sector by private banks also
declined during the period – see Table 4.12. The decline is also reflecting the
IDS WORKING PAPER 273
41 
Pu
bl
ic
se
ct
or Private sector
Industry Housing Rural Commer-
cial 
activities
Individuals Other
services
Total
1994 15.2 22.4 21.2 9.4 11.4 8.3 12.1 84.8
1995 14.9 23.9 19.8 9.6 13.1 6.5 12.1 85.1
1996 17.9 23.9 19.0 7.5 11.2 8.9 11.6 82.1
1997 9.5 26.0 19.4 8.6 11.2 13.1 12.2 90.5
1998 7.6 26.2 19.6 9.0 9.2 12.6 15.7 92.4
1999 6.1 29.3 18.5 8.9 10.0 13.9 13.3 93.9
2000 3.9 26.8 17.5 8.5 9.9 19.0 14.4 96.1
2001 3.0 29.7 7.2 7.9 10.9 23.3 18.0 97.0
2002 3.6 30.6 6.4 9.2 10.5 21.6 18.2 96.4
2003 3.7 28.5 6.1 10.9 10.5 23.0 17.3 96.3
20042 4.1 26.1 5.4 11.0 11.2 25.2 16.9 95.9
fact that a good deal of public enterprises was privatised. The increase in the
share of credit to the private sector benefited mostly individuals (e.g. consumer
credit, others) and other services (telecommunications, transport, education and
culture, press, informatics) with their shares in total credit going up from 8 per
cent to 25 per cent and 12 per cent to 17 per cent, respectively. Other sectors
whose shares in total credit increased were the industrial (which may be a 
statistical effect due to privatisation) and rural sectors. Credit to housing, which
refers mainly to mortgage lending, fell sharply.
Table 4.11 Loans from the private financial system – distribution
by sectors 1
as percent % of total
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. (1) December – balance end of period. (2) October 2004.
These trends are broadly similar between private and public credit, with the big
difference being that whilst the share of private credit to industry and other
services declined, the share of public credit to these activities went up. But the
latter may just be reflecting a statistical effect, as big state-owned companies
that fall under these categories were privatised.
It is difficult to say whether the SMEs and the poor benefited or not from
these trends. But it is possible to cautiously suggest that the increase in the
share of credit to the rural sector and to individuals may have benefited small
rural producers, and reached less wealthy individuals. At the same time, 
productive and commercial activities lost financing from the private banks, and
this may have harmed mostly the SMEs. So, what could be said is that the
redistribution of credit across sectors seems to have been in the form of a slight
IDS WORKING PAPER 273
42 
Pu
bl
ic
se
ct
or Private sector
Industry Housing Rural Commer-
cial 
activities
Individuals Other
services
Total
1994 2.0 29.4 12.1 2.9 18.9 13.9 20.8 98.0
1995 3.0 33.4 10.2 2.7 21.9 9.8 19.1 97.0
1996 2.6 34.7 8.8 3.8 19.3 14.5 16.3 97.4
1997 1.8 33.1 7.1 4.5 17.5 20.5 15.6 98.2
1998 1.2 33.2 7.4 4.3 15.1 21.9 16.9 98.8
1999 0.9 34.0 6.4 3.8 15.6 21.0 18.3 99.1
2000 1.0 29.5 5.6 4.5 14.3 25.7 19.4 99.0
2001 0.9 28.9 4.3 4.8 13.2 27.7 20.2 99.1
2002 1.1 28.7 3.6 6.1 13.4 27.0 20.1 98.9
2003 0.8 27.6 3.4 6.7 13.6 29.8 18.1 99.2
20042 1.2 25.9 2.8 7.4 14.3 31.8 16.7 98.8
shift from productive and commercial activities to consumer credit. Thus, a pre-
liminary hypothesis is that, whilst Basel I together with broader financial sector
reforms have affected the level of total credit negatively through requiring
banks to raise capital to meet the Basel rules for capital requirements, the
redistribution of credit across sectors may not have discriminated against the
less favoured households, though it may have affected the SMEs negatively.
Table 4.12 Loans from the public financial system – distribution by
sectors 1
as percent % of total
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. (1) December – balance end of period. (2) October 2004.
4.4 The role of directed credit as a countervailing force
Whilst it is difficult to assert how new credit distribution patterns affected the
SMEs and the poor, one clear fact is that the changing patterns closely follow
what happened to directed credit in Brazil. This sort of credit accounts for a
large part of total credit. In the 2000–2004 period, it varied between 36 per
cent and 44 per cent; if directed credit to the housing sector is excluded, it
stayed around 30 per cent.
As can be seen from Table 4.13, directed credit explains why total credit to the
Hoing sector fell so dramatically between 2000 and 2004, and why rural credit
expanded. Indeed, during the period, it contributed to nearly 90 per cent of the
fall in the housing sector credit, and 100 per cent of the increase in rural credit.
Also, the BNDES, which figures as the largest development bank in Brazil, 
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Pu
bl
ic
se
ct
or Private sector
Industry Housing Rural Commer-
cial 
activities
Individuals Other
services
Total
1994 25.3 17.0 28.2 14.4 5.6 4.0 5.5 74.7
1995 24.6 16.3 27.6 15.1 6.1 3.9 6.4 75.4
1996 30.1 15.3 27.2 10.4 4.8 4.5 7.7 69.9
1997 16.7 19.4 31.0 12.5 5.3 6.1 9.0 83.3
1998 12.8 20.6 29.4 12.8 4.5 5.1 14.8 87.2
1999 11.1 24.7 30.3 13.9 4.5 7.1 8.5 88.9
2000 7.7 23.3 32.8 13.6 4.3 10.3 8.0 92.3
2001 6.9 31.2 12.6 13.6 6.7 15.0 14.1 93.1
2002 7.6 33.7 10.8 14.2 5.8 12.8 15.1 92.4
2003 7.8 29.6 10.1 17.1 6.0 13.1 16.3 92.2
20042 8.8 26.6 9.5 16.6 6.5 14.9 17.2 91.2
accounting for about 20 per cent of total directed credit in the country,19 may
well explain why credit from the public sector to the industrial sector expanded
between 2000 and 2004, thus largely offsetting the decline in credit to the
sector by private banks (see Tables 4.10–4.12).20 For the purpose of this study
whose focus is on SMEs and the poor, it is important to notice that the BNDEs
traditionally lends to large projects and companies, not the SMEs (although
resources it lends through other banks and development agencies may reach
the SMEs).
Table 4.13 Directed credit as a proportion of total credit
2000–2004 %
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.(1) Includes bo th direct resources and resources passed to
other banks.
So, where credit may have benefited the SMEs and/or the poor, this was due to
directed credit. For example, there is no directed credit in Brazil to the SMEs,
which therefore may have lost (apart from directed credit to micro-businesses
implemented in 2003, which may have reached small business, but mainly
through credit to individuals); where the poor may have gained, for example
small rural producers through the expansion of rural credit, this was due to
increases in directed rural credit. 
But has the increase in the share of rural credit been accompanied by more
credit to small producers? It is hard to gauge this, due to lack of available data.
But information on credit by size of credit, which bears some correlation with
size of the rural producer, suggests that, at least for 2001–2003, no discernible
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Housing Rural BNDES 1 Other Total Total
minus
housing
Dec–2000 15.7 8.5 17.8 2.0 44.0 28.3
Dec–2001 6.4 7.9 19.7 1.6 35.6 29.2
Dec–2002 5.7 9.2 22.4 0.8 38.1 32.3
Dec–2003 5.6 11.0 22.2 1.0 39.8 34.2
Oct–2004 5.1 11.0 20.0 0.8 36.8 31.7
19 This includes both direct resources provided by the BNDEs and those resources the 
bank distributes via other banks. Direct resources account for 48 per cent of total 
resources managed by the bank in October 2004.
20 Credit by the BNDES accounted for 12.2 per cent of total credit in Brazil in December
2004. If to that we add credit by the other four major development banks – BNB, 
BASA, BRDE and BDMG – the proportion of credit provided by Brazil’s development 
banks in total credit goes up to 13.8 per cent. 
change took place. This is true both for total and free rural credit – see Table
4.14. The only noticeable change is a relative decline in credit to small producers
through PRONAF (National Programme for Strengthening Family-Based
Agriculture) – from 15 per cent of total rural credit in 1999 to 10 per cent in
2003.
Table 4.14 Total and free rural credit, by size of loans 1
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.(1) Category I, II, III and IV correspond respectively to the
ranges 0 to 40.000 Reais; 40.000 to 150.000 Reais; 150.000 to 300.000 Reais; and above
300.000 Reais; for the year 2003, the value 40.000 is increased to 60.000.
The main message is that directed credit in Brazil is a powerful factor in 
determining credit patterns in the country, and may have had an important
countervailing role to credit decline as a result of financial reforms and Basel I.
Moreover, although the credit share by public banks (including development
banks) has been drastically reduced, they still seemed to have a crucial role in
credit provision for productive urban sectors and rural activities. 
So, what it seems is that financial reforms and Basel I did not have a major
impact on credit allocation in ways that harmed the poor or the SMEs – at
least not in a major way – due the maintenance of two key institutional factors
that have historically strongly featured in Brazil’s financial system: large public
and development banks, and directed credit. Whilst the presence of public
banks in Brazil has been downscaled, with no plans to change it, directed credit
remains as seen by the government as an important instrument for credit 
promotion and allocation towards the less favoured segments. 
This is so much the case that the Brazilian government has recently undertaken
a number of initiatives in support of micro-business and the poor in Brazil
through the creation of a number of mechanisms that include directed credit to
individuals and micro-business.21 However, scepticism has been raised as to
whether private banks will really use this type of directed credit as a starting
point to penetrate the SMEs market, or whether they would simply deposit the
resources with the Central Bank. The question thus still remains of how to
IDS WORKING PAPER 273
45
Credit as a percent % of total credit
I II III IV
2001 40.9 21.3 7 30.8
2002 35.8 25.15 8.9 30.1
2003 42.7 15.8 11.2 30.3
Free credit as a percent % of total credit
2001 2.6 0.8 0.3 0.3
2002 2.6 1.1 0.4 1.1
2003 3.1 0.7 0.4 1.1
make mainstream lending more widespread across income groups, and how to
ensure that the new regulatory framework for capital adequacy does not work
as a limiting force for the expansion of credit in Brazil, especially to the SMEs
and the poor.
5 Conclusions and policy 
recommendations
The Brazilian government is taking a number of initiatives to provide banking
services to larger segments of the country’s population, and credit to micro-
business. These initiatives are welcome in light of the reduced levels of credit in
Brazil, and to counteract possible negative effects on credit expansion of the
new capital accord. But we hold the view that the new regulatory framework
for the banking system should be better aligned with the governments’ policy
aims. 
Our assessment is that this is not the case at present. The New Basel rules, as
Brazil’s regulators intend to apply in the country, may have at least three effects
that can affect credit to the SMEs and the poor negatively: further banking
concentration, banking portfolio concentration away from the SMEs, and
increased credit pro-cyclicality. Our research shows that these possible effects
are not part of the concern of Brazilian regulators. The banking community, in
its turn, is too busy in its efforts to be prepared for the new rules when these
come into effect in early 2007, and therefore is not addressing these issues
either.
But it is important to do so. Looking at the current capital rules (or Basel I) as
adopted in Brazil, it was possible to see that these rules have contributed to the
banking concentration observed in the late 1990s and early this century, to a
sharp decline in the share of credit in banks’ portfolio of assets – and related to
that, to a decline in credit as a proportion of total GDP in the ten years since
the mid-1990s. The India study undertaken in parallel (IDS Working Paper)
shows that, under different economic circumstances, there too credit share in
banks’ total assets has declined as a result of Basel I; it moreover shows that
credit to small enterprises declined sharply relative to total credit. 
The effects of Basel I both in Brazil and India thus clearly demonstrate that
changes in the regulatory framework for banks can have important effects on
the structure of the banking system and on credit patterns. It is therefore
important to avoid a repeat of the negative consequences that often 
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21 The other initiatives include the creation of cooperatives to benefit its associates, 
mainly in the rural sector, and the so-called correspondente bancario, which is aimed at
providing financial services in regions and locations that do not have access to such 
services. For a detailed discussion of these initiatives, see Gottschalk and Sodré (2005).
accompany the introduction of new banking rules. Particularly at a time inter-
national efforts are being made to reduce poverty worldwide, it is important to
raise awareness – and encourage the debate on the possible negative implica-
tions of the new capital rules – or Basel II – which will come into effect in early
2007, for the SMEs and the poor. The debate could help create a consensus
around measures that could be implemented to address the shortcomings of
the new rules; in particular, measures that can help remove or at least reduce
the potential bias of such rules against credit, especially to the neediest 
segments.
Since 1999–2000, when discussions on the initial proposals for a new capital
rules started, a number of ideas have emerged on how to mitigate the possible
negative impacts of the new rules on credit patterns and pro-cyclicality. For
example, a menu of options exist on how to reduce the pro-cyclicality of credit,
which developing countries in particular should worry about, due to the fact
that economic volatility in these countries are higher than in the OECD 
countries. Of course, there are some technical challenges associated with each
proposal, which require careful examination. Nonetheless, the options exist and
are feasible. What really seems to be missing is lack of political initiative, which
can be partly explained by a lack of debate on these issues, as this study on
Brazil suggests.
In what follows, we refer to a few possible measures for adoption put forward
and discussed in international academic and policy circles, which could address
the issues raised in this study.
l To address inequity arising from the use of the IRB approach by the large 
banks and the standardised approach by the remaining banks, an equalising 
factor could be applied over the banks adopting the IRB approach, so as to 
level up their capital requirements. That would address inequity issues, and 
could have the additional benefit of discouraging banks from changing their
portfolios away from smaller borrowers, typically the ones deemed as 
riskier. That would be moreover consistent with the Basel Committee’s 
primary intention to address relative rather than absolute risk.
l To address portfolio concentration, in addition to the application of a factor
as proposed above, regulators could work on a formula to smooth the risk 
curve for SMEs, as the Basel Committee has done in the past between the
Consultative Papers CP2 and CP3. As said earlier, this could be done in a 
number of ways, but would it would be up to the country’s regulators to 
choose which method might be the most appropriate one; the decision 
could be based on technical studies to assess the impacts of alternative 
measures on credit to the SMEs.
l To deal with pro-cyclicality, the smoothing of the risk curve proposed 
above would be beneficial for that purpose. In addition, other counter-
cyclical measures could be adopted, such as to encourage the use by banks 
of different models (Persaud 2000), and the use of models that ‘look 
through the cycle’, as opposed to the most utilised models that look at 
one point of the cycle. A further measure would be to reward portfolio 
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diversification. The reason for the latter is that, in addition to reducing risk 
for a given level of return (which is why diversified portfolios are desirable 
in the first place), portfolio diversification could contribute to reduced cred
it pro-cyclicality (IADB 2004; Griffith-Jones, Spratt and Segoviano 2004). 
This is because a negative event would affect only that part of a bank’s 
portfolio that share similar characteristics and therefore is vulnerable to the
same types of shocks, not the entire portfolio. 
The measures proposed thus far address the three issues this paper has high-
lighted as key ones that are receiving little attention in Brazil. In addition to
these, a number of other issues constitute a major challenge for Brazil’s 
regulatory authorities. 
For example, will the regulators have the capacity to validate models and 
monitor them adequately within the proposed time frame? Is the timetable
proposed by Brazil’s regulators long enough? Should regulators not need more
time to be able to adequately validate and monitor risk assessment systems
adopted by banks, especially those that will opt for the most advanced models?
Should the proposal for adopting internal models for measuring operational risk
not be eliminated, given the sheer complexity of measuring operational risk and
the difficulties regulators would face to monitor their use? And in the case it is
adopted, could a factor not be equally employed to avoid that some banks end
up with lower capital requirements for operational risk than others?
Also, it would be important that the regulatory authorities could take account
of the fact that the risk management practices should be effective, but not
excessively intrusive to the point of inhibiting lending activities and programmes
that have a social purpose.
This study on Brazil thus shows that implementation of Basel rules poses a
number of challenges to national banking regulators, and to the country at
large. But what lessons can we learn from the Brazilian study for other
developing countries? 
The Brazil study shows that the Basel rules are not neutral, and this should be
borne in mind when a country is considering adopting such rules. In this regard,
it is important that measures being considered for adoption are carefully 
examined, and that their implications for development finance are identified
and properly addressed. But the Brazil study also shows that, had the country
not had its development finance architecture in place, the impacts of Basel I on
development finance would have been far bigger. For example, although Basel I
did affect credit in Brazil, there is no evidence that the credit to the SMEs, to
rural producers or to the urban poor was negatively affected, at least in a major
way. A main reason for this outcome is that credit patterns during the period
under Basel I have been influenced by directed credit policy, which in a number
of cases were intended to protect the less favoured segments. 
From this, the lesson we can draw for other developing countries is that 
institutions that support development finance are key and should therefore be
preserved, as there is nothing indicating that an entirely market-based banking
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system will serve the financing needs of the small businesses and the poor. This
is even more so under Basel I and especially Basel II, as the latter has a clear bias
against perceived higher risk borrowers, which usually are the small businesses
and the poor. But many poor countries do not even have development finance
institutions, in a number of cases because they have reformed their banking 
systems and in the process dismantled such institutions. 
The lack of such institutions makes prudence towards the adoption of Basel
rules even more necessary for these countries. One should not forget that 
capital markets in poor countries are still very small and that the banking sector
is still the major source of finance to the economy. Of course, one may contend
that microfinance in poor countries managed by foreign NGOs and other
organisations have had an important role in providing resources to the small
businesses and the poor. However, mainstream finance should also be able to
reach these segments, and to finance projects (large or otherwise) that can
benefit them indirectly as well. It is thus important that the system is regulated
in ways that it can serve both the economy and the most needy as well. 
IDS WORKING PAPER 273
49 
Annex 1
Table A1 Basel I in Brazil: risk weights for different categories of
assets
Source: Annex IV, Resolution No. 2.099 of 17 August 1994. Available at: www.bcb.gov.br
Weight Loans to/investment in:
0% l Brazil Central Government’s bonds
l Foreign currencies deposited with the Central Bank
l Compulsory deposits with the Central Bank
20%
l Bank deposits in other banks
l Gold
l Deposits and credits in foreign currencies
l Tax related credits (then raised to 300% in August 1999, through
Circular no. 2916).
50% l Government bonds outside the Central Government
l Inter-bank deposits with own resources
l Foreign currencies abroad
l Mortgages
100% l Private bonds with own resources
l Investments in variable income assets
l Investments in commodities
l Operations linked to stock exchanges and future markets
l Exchange operations
l Diverse credits 
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